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London Creditors and the Fifteenth-Century Depression 
Dr Matthew Frank Stevens, FHistS. 
Swansea University 
 
Abstract 
Evidence of debts owed to Londoners, and contested before the royal Court of 
Common Pleas, allows an examination of the role of London creditors in the English 
depression of the fifteenth century and a reassessment of its causes. Here we examine 
four main issues. What is the nature of the Court of Common Pleas evidence (section I)? 
What were the three main forms of credit offered by Londoners –unsecured cash loans, 
sales of goods on credit, and written instruments called bonds (section II)? What is 
yielded by decadal analysis of Londoners’ extension of credit in the fifteenth century –
making direct comparisons with Pamela Nightingale’s published Statute Merchant and 
Staple data (section III)? What defines, in modern economic terms, the claim of so called 
‘monetarist’ historians that credit was actively withdrawn during the depression, and how 
is this verified by the actions of London creditors (section IV)?  It is concluded that the 
records of the Court of Common Pleas provide the detailed evidence monetarist 
historians have previously lacked both to prove that Londoners actively withdrew credit 
during the fifteenth century and to demonstrate that they employed pure equilibrium 
credit rationing in order to do so.   
 
 In 1939 Michael Postan wrote a short but extremely influential survey of the fifteenth 
century for the Economic History Review’s ‘Revisions in Economic History Series’.  In 
this article he pointed out that during the century the population dwindled and so 
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agricultural output waned and seigniorial incomes dropped, at a time when, as a 
consequence of war, ‘Most of the outlying branches of English foreign trade were lopped 
off, one after another.’1 Postan’s claim that we ought to understand demographic decline 
as being central to England’s fifteenth-century economic stagnation continues to cast a 
long shadow over the historiography of the period, and for most economic historians it 
remains valid in substance, if not in quite the form and detail in which he articulated it.2  
Nevertheless, much effort has been invested into the construction of alternative 
interpretations of the mid fifteenth-century economic crisis. First, in 1962, Tony Bridbury 
argued that historians ought to focus not on absolute levels of output and on the 
landlords’ income but on per capita income and the rising standards of living which, for 
many, may have accompanied demographic decline.3 Then, from the 1970s to 1990s, in 
the so-called ‘Brenner debate’, neo-Marxist historians attempted to recast the century as a 
painful but progressive transition from feudal to capitalist modes of production.4  But 
neither of these bodies of work have undermined substantially Postan’s position that the 
economic depression of the fifteenth century was most directly a result of demographic 
decline.  
The more enduring challenge to Postan’s work has come from Pamela 
Nightingale, John Day and others, who argue it was actually a shortage of silver coinage, 
leading to deflation and a withdrawal of credit at all levels, that was chiefly responsible 
for the English experience of the economic depression of the fifteenth century, in 
                                                 
1 Postan, ‘Revisions’, p. 163. 
2 Bolton, Money, p. 260; Hatcher and Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages, pp. 21–65. 
3 Bridbury, Economic Growth. 
4 Aston and Philpin, eds., The Brenner Debate; more recently, Dimmock, The Origin of Capitalism. 
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conjunction with demographic decline.5 In short, Nightingale and other so-called 
‘monetarist historians’, have taken as a starting point the modern economic concept of the 
Irvine Fisher equation, which elegantly expresses that the less total currency there is in 
circulation, the greater the velocity with which that currency must circulate through the 
economy (PT=MV where P = average price, T = total volume of transactions, M = total 
money supply, V = velocity of circulation).6  That is to say, when fewer coins are in 
circulation, each coin must change hands more frequently in order to sustain the gross 
domestic product (expressed as PT/M=V, a decline in M causing a corresponding 
increase in V). However, when the total number of coins is too small to service 
realistically all of the potential transactions, two effects result: first, the economy will 
necessarily shrink until the remaining currency can service it, in short, a liquidity crisis; 
and second, deflation occurs, whereby the buying power of each remaining coin 
increases, which can make the remaining coins impractically overvalued for daily 
transactions.7  
Monetarist historians have argued that monetary contraction explains the collapse 
and stagnation of the fifteenth-century English economy because, as a result of a chronic 
shortage of silver bullion, the crown all but ceased to mint new silver pennies, 
halfpennies, and farthings from the later fourteenth century to the late fifteenth century, 
while English silver specie dwindled due to natural wastage (that is, clipping, loss, etc.) 
and export to the continent where its relatively high silver content lent itself to profitable 
                                                 
5 Day, ‘The Great Bullion Famine’; Gold coins were minted in an attempt to offset silver shortages, but 
they failed to compensate. See Miskimin, ‘Monetary movements’ and Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit, and 
mortality’.    
6 On the Fisher equation see Rigby, English Society, pp. 957–7; see, for more recent versions of it, Munro, 
‘Review: Money’.   
7 Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’; Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit, and mortality’. 
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debasement and re-minting.  Thus, in 1351 there were about 56 pence in circulation per 
head of the population, but by 1422 this had fallen to just 13 pence per head, leading to 
frequent complaints to parliament about the poor state of the coinage and the lack of 
small change, and ultimately to a withdrawal of credit.8 Conversely, economic recovery 
came when new coinage eventually reversed deflationary trends and induced the renewed 
extension of credit.9 
This monetarist interpretation of the fifteenth century depression as being 
primarily the result of a shortage of specie has proved to be extremely controversial.  It 
has a possible weakness, in so far as it presupposes that credit, which can potentially 
offset a lack of coinage by elastically adding liquidity or enhancing the velocity of specie 
circulation, was withdrawn rather than extended as mint output fell.  That is to say, 
monetarists argue that money supply and credit supply were directly linked, whereas 
Postan’s followers believe them to have been inversely linked; the total value of 
transactions in an economy being a combination of the specie, plus credit, changing 
hands.10 The recent and path breaking work of both demographically minded and 
monetarist historians has affirmed that medieval society made regular use of credit at all 
levels.11 But this work done little to resolve questions over just how extensive this use of 
credit was at any given time. 
The key issue for historians is whether or not there was a direct or an inverse 
correlation of change in money supply and amount of credit available. Monetarists offer 
                                                 
8 Summarized in Bolton, Money, pp. 227–57. 
9 See chiefly Nightingale, ‘England and the European depression’, and, more recently, Nightingale, ‘Gold, 
credit, and mortality’.   For Nightingale’s collected essays see, Nightingale, Trade, Money and Power. 
10 On medieval ‘gross domestic product’ see Bolton, Money, pp. 124–8. 
11 Briggs, ‘The availability of credit’; Briggs, Credit and Village Society. Schofield and Lambrecht, eds.., 
Credit and the Rural Economy; Bolton, Money; Nightingale, Trade, Money and Power; Nightingale, ‘Gold 
credit and mortality’.  
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the explanation that credit is overwhelmingly withdrawn when creditors, aware of a 
shortage of specie, become wary that their potential debtors may not be able to find the 
coin to repay them.12  This withdrawal would have been effected, first and foremost, by 
London creditors, who dominated trade in realm’s economic hub, precipitating a credit 
crisis that then radiated outwards like ‘ripples…into the countryside’.13 Parallels, if 
somewhat tenuous, have even been drawn with the early 1990s recession, and could 
similarly be drawn with the 2008 liquidity crisis.14 Postan, and other demographically 
minded historians such as Hatcher and Bailey either ignore or minimise the importance of 
shortages of coin, and Bolton has carefully articulated the view that the extensive use of 
credit would have negated the effects of a shortage of coin.15  
One key problem in determining the role of credit is that unambiguous evidence 
about its use is scarce. As  Bolton recently lamented in Money in the Medieval English 
Economy, surprisingly, ‘there is only one known surviving set of English mercantile 
accounts for the late Middle Ages, those of Gilbert Maghfeld, a failed London 
ironmonger in the reign of Richard II...After that, we have to wait for the Paston letters 
from about 1440 onward and the letters and papers of the Cely family from the 1460s and 
1480s...[which offer at best]...passing comments about the shortage of coin and a lack of 
buyers’ for agricultural produce.16 Nightingale has written extensively about Maghfeld’s 
accounts, and his declining profits at a time of weak mint output.17 In her most 
                                                 
12 For example, Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’, esp. pp. 1100; Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, 
esp. pp. 56–66. 
13 Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, pp. 67–8. 
14 Ibid., pp. 53, 68. 
15 For a summary see, Bolton, Money, pp. 261–63,  268–95; Postan, ‘Revisions’; Postan, The Medieval 
Economy and Society; Hatcher and Bailey, Modelling the Middle Ages. 
16 Bolton, Money, pp. 258–9; on Maghfeld see Rigby, The Overseas Trade of Boston, pp. 240–2. 
17 Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’. 
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comprehensive study, she has attempted to use the records of relatively high value 
(generally over £10) debts in default recognized under the Statutes Merchant and Staple 
and deposited with Chancery, to prove that credit was withdrawn by Londoners from 
1400.18 However, these articles have provoked continued disagreement.19 Maghfeld’s 
accounts are possibly unrepresentative, and an unknown proportion of debts in default 
recognized under the Statutes Merchant and Staple were non-commercial penal bonds –
for example, to secure a marriage settlement– to be enforced only in the event of non-
performance, and anyway involved amounts which were too large to represent most 
every-day mercantile transactions.20  Likewise, Briggs has recently attempted to engage 
in this debate through the evidence of rural credit as seen in manor courts in the period 
1400–1480 but agnostically concluded that ‘legal and institutional changes’ mean that 
‘uncertainty remains, about the direction and degree of chronological change in numbers 
of new rural credit transactions.’21 
There are three main reasons why this debate has been so hard to resolve. First, 
little evidence has been available for analysis which links changes in credit usage to 
changes in mint output or demographic decline in a manner which cannot be either 
reinterpreted or dismissed as coincidental by either monetarists or demographically 
minded historians.  Second, despite the centrality of London’s influential merchant-
creditors to the economy, little attempt has been made to assess the ways and means by 
which Londoners extended or withdrew credit. Third, while the monetarists assert that 
                                                 
18 Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’, pp. 1093–4.  
19 Bolton, ‘Was there a ‘crisis of credit”’; Nightingale, ‘A crisis of credit’. 
20 Bolton, Money, 276–9. See also, Postan, ‘Private financial instruments’, 35–8; Kowaleski, Local Markets 
and Regional Trade, pp. 212–20; and  McNall, ‘The business of statutory debt registries, pp. 68–88.  
21 Briggs, ‘The availability of credit’, pp. 1, 23.  
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creditors withdrew, or more accurately scaled back, credit, how this was done has not yet 
been explained in modern economic terms. 
However, there is evidence available; that is, the records of the royal Court of 
Common Pleas, document class CP 40, in the National Archives.  Drawing on these data, 
we examine four main issues. What is the nature of the Court of Common Pleas evidence 
(section I)? What were the main forms of credit offered by Londoners (section II)? What 
is yielded by a decadal analysis of Londoners’ extension of credit in the fifteenth century 
–making direct comparisons with Nightingale’s published Statute Merchant and Staple 
data (section III)? What defines, in modern economic terms, the monetarist claim that 
credit was ‘withdrawn’ during the depression, and how is this verified by the actions of 
London creditors (section IV)?  The records of the Court of Common Pleas provide the 
detailed evidence that monetarist historians have previously lacked both to prove that 
Londoners actively withdrew credit during the fifteenth century and to define how they 
went about doing so.   
 
I 
The Court of Common Pleas was a national venue for interpersonal litigation 
which sat at Westminster.  It had four man sorts of jurisdiction over cases begun by 
original writ from chancery: real actions of ownership and possession in land; personal 
actions such as debt, account or covenant concerning single or aggregate sums of 40s. or 
more; mixed real and personal actions such as ejectment from lands under lease; and 
finally trespass actions such as assault and theft.22 The court held four annual terms of 
                                                 
22 Hastings, Common Pleas, p. 16. 
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roughly one to two months each and usually offered adjournments on a term to term 
basis, making for a lethargic process in which it regularly took a year or more to resolve a 
case.23 About 9,400 legal actions were in progress during each of the court’s four annual 
law-terms in 1400, falling to about 4,500 in 1450 and to about 3,800 in 1501, but with an 
increasing proportion at each interval having moved beyond the administrative mesne 
process stage to reach the stage of pleading before the justices, that is, a ratio of 22:1, 
13:1, and 5:1 cases in progress to cases plead, respectively.24 This means that annually, as 
a very rough estimate, the king’s justices heard the detailed pleading of about 1,700 cases 
in 1400, about 1,400 cases in 1450, and about 3,000 in 1501. Among these lawsuits, 
cases laid in London – that is, arising from disputed agreements or events alleged to have 
taken place within the city – consistently comprise 12 to 14 per cent of litigation; 
Londoners pursued on average 28 lawsuits per thousand residents in the fifteenth century, 
as compared with 2 to 4 lawsuits per thousand residents in most English counties.25 
Among these, 80 per cent of Londoners’ lawsuits were economically-orientated actions 
of debt, detinue or account, as opposed to only about half among non-Londoners, 
reaffirming Londoners’ central role in the national economy.26   
The Centre for Metropolitan History, within the Institute of Historical Research, 
University  London, carried out a major Arts and Humanities Research Council funded 
project entitled ‘Londoners and the law: pleadings in the Court of Common Pleas, 1399–
1509’ (LATL) in order to make a substantial sample of these records available for 
                                                 
23 Stevens, ‘Failed arbitrations’, p. 26. 
24 Stevens, ‘Londoners and the Court of Common Pleas’, p. 228, table 12.1. 
25 Ibid., pp. 228, 231–5. 
26 Ibid., p. 241. 
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analysis.27 Active from 2006 to 2009, the LATL project, identified all pleaded cases 
relating to London (either laid in London or involving a London litigant) within four 
main sample periods, 1399–1409, 1420–9, 1445–50, and 1460–8, plus the outlying years 
1480 and 1500; that is, thirty-eight years all together.28  All of these London-related 
lawsuits, 6,321 in total, have since, with the help of the Marc Fitch Fund, been edited and 
published by British History Online as a searchable, English-language calendar.29 This 
calendared dataset includes the names over 30,000 individuals and the details of nearly 
8,000 alleged events, such as assaults, thefts, or debts meeting or exceeding the 40s. 
minimum-value threshold for cases to be heard before the Court of Common Pleas.  
Among the calendared events are 4,684 alleged credit transactions cited in 3,870 cases of 
alleged debt, some cases citing multiple transactions of the same or different debt types.30 
Debt cases were overwhelmingly brought using variations of the praecipe writ: 
debt on an unsecured cash loan; debt on a sale of goods on credit; or debt as recorded in a 
written instrument, usually a bond.31 Each pleaded case specifies the litigants’ names; the 
value of the debt; where and when the debt was contracted; when payment was due; and 
in instances of sales of goods on credit, a list of the items bought.  Further, after the 1413 
Statute of Additions, plaintiffs were required to supply each defendant’s status or 
occupation and his/her county and place of residence, or risk being nonsuited.32 This 
                                                 
27 AHRC award ref. AR119247. 
28 The National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office, CP40/555, 559, 560, 562–569, 571–572, 574, 576–
580, 582–583, 585, 587, 590, 592, 594, 636–667, 669–675, 736–746, 748–759, 796–829, 871–874, 951–
954. Seventeen additional rolls, 556–558, 561, 570, 573, 575, 581, 584, 586, 588–589, 591, 593, 595, 668 
and 747, fell within the sample periods, but were designated ‘unfit for production’ by the TNA. No roll 
exists for Easter term 1461, likely due to civil war, or Michaelmas 1464, likely due to plague. 
29 Mackman and Stevens, eds., ‘ Court of Common Pleas’. 
30 In 13 instances, a bond is explicitly stated to secure a sale of goods, and so adding loans, sales of goods 
and bonds together yields a total of 4.698.  
31 Baker, An Introduction, pp. 57–8, 321–5, 540–1 (specimen writ).  
32 Statute of Additions, 1 Hen. V, c.5, Statutes of the Realm, vol.2, p. 171. 
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fostered a culture of litigation in which plaintiffs routinely elected to supply all of this 
information for both themselves and their defendants. 
This detailed personal information allows the identification of a sample of 
transactions in which a Londoner was a creditor, or plaintiff; that is, 2,571 disputed credit 
agreements by loan, sale of goods or bond, cited in 2,027 cases.33 Because the franchise 
of the city of London included the right of city officials to hear all cases between two 
Londoners in the city’s own courts, when a Londoner appeared before the Court of 
Common Pleas it was normally in a suit against a non-Londoner, most often as a 
plaintiff.34  Thus the data presented here is overwhelmingly that of credit relationships 
between London creditors and non-London debtors, providing a barometer of the city’s 
relationship with the national economy. 
 
Table 1. The LATL dataset 
All cases 
in dataset 
All cases citing 
credit transactions 
All credit 
transactions 
London 
creditors’ 
cases 
London 
creditors’ 
transactions 
6,321 3,870 4,684 2,027 2,571 
Source: Mackman and Stevens, eds, ‘Court of Common Pleas’. 
 
 
II 
The disputed point between monetarists and Postan’s followers may be simplified 
as the question ‘Was credit withdrawn by Londoners as a consequence of a liquidly 
                                                 
33 In 10 instances, a bond is explicitly stated to secure a sale of goods, and so adding loans, sales of goods 
and bonds together yields a total of 2,581.  
34 Londoners, nevertheless, increasingly sued other Londoners, in 5%–10% of their LATL-calendared 
lawsuits c.1400, in 16% c.1450 and 17% c.1500. Stevens, ‘Londoners and the Court of Common Pleas’, pp. 
239–40. 
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crisis?’ Yet little consideration has been given to the variety of forms in which credit was 
actually available.  There were, in fact, notable differences between the credit 
arrangements typically described as loans, sales of goods, and bonds.  Each pertained to 
debts of a different average value, each was to be repaid over a different period of time 
(Tables 2–5), and, as discussed in Section IV below, the usage of each altered 
independently in response to economic stress.  
 
Table 2. London creditors’ loan, sale of goods, and bond values in shillings 
Years Loan Sale of goods Bond 
 no. mean median mode no. mean median mode no. mean median mode 
1390-99 8 183 71 40 37 331 160 40 59 782 320 400 
1400-09 26 108 55 40 55 143 60 40 118 587 200 400 
1410-19 14 107 37 93.33 36 208 70 40 176 425 150 40 
1420-29 24 85 22 40 45 141 77 40 209 308 171 200 
1430-39 11 51 21 MMa 25 320 52 40 115 380 160 66.66 
1440-49 37 105 40 200 104 221 116 40 364 340 195 400 
1450-59 36 152 40 40 79 133 67 40 283 454 213 400 
1460-69 41 123 40 40 55 144 100 40 326 407 180 200 
1470-79 10 118 42 200 23 191 55 40 117 334 200 400 
1480-89 1 11 11 11 5 126 100 MMb 13 229 133 MMd 
1490-1500 9 33 24 60 33 298 113 MMc 87 368 165 400 
All data 
1390-1500 217 112 
 
40 
 
40 497 
 
198 
 
81 
 
40 1867 
 
405 
 
193 
 
400 
Notes: MM = multimodal. 
a 4.33s. / 12s.  
b 40s. / 86.66s. / 100s.    
c 60s. / 240s. / 317.75s. / 380s. 
d 100s. / 133.33s. 
Source: Mackman and Stevens, eds, ‘Court of Common Pleas’. 
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The cash loan, described as a single or aggregate sum borrowed (mutuatus 
fuisset), was typically the lowest value debt transaction, often just equal to or even below 
(if grouped with other debts) the 40s. threshold required for prosecution at Common 
Pleas and only irregularly exceeding £10 (Table 2) –the value of the least-valuable 
quarter of Statute Merchant and Staple certificates assessed by Nightingale.35 The mean 
value of London creditors’ loans in the LATL dataset is about £5.  In addition to stand-
alone transactions, cash loans were also often alleged to have accompanied sales of goods 
on credit.  These may occasionally have been a fictitious means of raising the aggregate 
sum of an alleged debt to the 40s. threshold for prosecution at Common Pleas. For 
example, in 1421 London mercer Thomas Turnour sought a debt from John Botall of 
Nottingham, arising from a 1408 sale of two ells of linen cloth for 22s. 8d. and a 1411 
sale of 2 kerchiefs of lawn for 12s., allegedly accompanied by a cash loan of 5s.4d., 
sufficient to bring the aggregate debt to precisely 40s.36 But usually the sale of goods 
alone exceeded the 40s.threshold for litigation, as when in 1464 William Havelok sought 
from a ‘pedlar’ of Bury St Edmunds £30 for wine, plus £10 arising from a cash loan.37 
Similarly, loans were also alleged, although less frequently, to have accompanied the 
sealing of one or more bonds, as when in 1460 London gentleman Robert Enges plead 
that London butcher William Ordo owed him 43s. 4d. on a bond, plus 16s. 8d.for a cash 
loan agreed on the same day.38 While some creditors probably extended lines of credit to 
                                                 
35 Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’, 1087. 
36 TNA, CP40/640, rot.109d; and similarly, regarding 40s. for spices plus an loan, TNA, CP40/754, 
rot.091d. 
37 TNA, CP40/811, rot.119; and similarly TNA, CP40/651, rot,223d. 
38 TNA, CP40/798, rot.123. 
This is a PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT only.  
See the published version for reference. Economic History Review 2016. 
 13 
particular debtors primarily in the form of cash loans, lawsuits much less frequently 
reflect this than they do mixed credit in cash and goods, or repeated sales of goods on 
credit (see below). For example, in 1461 London citizen and fishmonger Robert 
Derlyngton, alleged that he had loaned Prior John Grannysden of the priory of St James 
at Tandridge (Surrey) moneys totalling £64 6s. 9d. for ‘the use and profit’ of the priory 
on four occasions between May 1458 and December 1460, and supplied the priory with 
fresh and salt fish determined by an accounting to be worth a total of £27 15s. 5½d.39 
Loans had a relatively short repayment period. Between 1390 and about 1430 
most Londoners’ loans cited in litigation stipulated a payment deadline, and these were 
typically five months or less from the making of the loan. From the 1430s onwards, loans 
were, in over 80 per cent of instances, described as payable upon request (solvendum 
eidem X cum inde requisitum fuisset). The legal threshold for failure to pay ‘upon 
request’ was not clearly defined, but in practice the post-request payment period would 
have been no less than the time required for a plaintiff to lay an action of debt before a 
court with competence and jurisdiction plus a defendant’s maximum period of admissible 
delay (e.g. essoins for illness) before appearing before the court, perhaps as little as a few 
weeks in a county or borough court and a few months at Common Pleas, although 
significantly longer delays could sometimes be orchestrated.40 Only once, in a case 
involving a particularly high value transaction of £26, does the creditor of an alleged loan 
specify multiple repayment instalments, over eleven months.41    
 
                                                 
39 TNA, CP40/802, rot.124. 
40 Stevens, ‘Failed arbitrations’, pp. 26–7. 
41 TNA, CP40/741, rot.456. 
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Table 3. London creditors’ loans, terms of payment 
Years All loans 
with 
payment 
data 
Loans 
stipulating one 
payment date 
Mean payment 
period in 
monthsa 
Loans 
stipulating 
multiple 
payment dates 
Loans payable 
on request 
Per cent 
payable 
on request 
      
1390-99 8 7 4 - 1 13 
1400-09 26 21 3 - 5  19 
1410-19 14 13 3 - 1 7 
1420-29 24 18 5 - 6 25 
1430-39 11 2 3 - 9 82 
1440-49 37 4 5 1 32 86 
1450-59 36 1 3 - 35 97 
1460-69 41 2 3 - 39 95 
1470-79 10 1 7 - 9 90 
1480-89 1 - - - 1 100 
1490-1500 9 - - - 9 100 
 
All data 
1390-1500 
 
 
217 
 
69 
 
4 
 
1 
 
147 
 
68 
Notes: a Stipulated payment periods of 1–30 days have been calculated as one month.  
Source: Mackman and Stevens, eds, ‘Court of Common Pleas’. 
 
 
Sales of goods on credit tended to involve larger amounts than loans. While the 
mode value of sales was similar to loans, being 40s. throughout the fifteenth century, the 
mean value of Londoners’ sales of goods on credit in the LATL dataset is over £10, twice 
the mean value of loans.  As illustrated by Turnour v. Botall, cited above, Londoners’ 
lawsuits brought on debts arising from sales of goods on credit are often illustrative of 
lines of credit extended to repeat customers.42 A typical is lawsuit is that in which 
London citizen and skinner John Norys alleged in 1461 that Sir Edward Broke, Lord 
Cobham, owed him £25 3s. 4d. arising from a December 1454 accounting of debts 
                                                 
42 TNA, CP40/640, rot.109d. 
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outstanding, plus four further sales of peltry and gowns to Lord Cobham as recently as 
March 1456.43  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. London creditors’ sales of goods, terms of payment 
Notes: a Stipulated payment periods of 1–30 days have been calculated as one month.  
Source: Mackman and Stevens, eds, ‘Court of Common Pleas’. 
 
 
The typical payment period for a sale of goods on credit was similar to that of a 
loan.  Between 1390 and about 1430 most Londoners’ sales on credit cited in litigation 
stipulated a payment deadline, typically five months or less from the day of sale. As was 
                                                 
43 TNA, CP40/802, 285d. 
Years All sales 
with 
payment 
data 
Sales 
stipulating one 
payment date 
Mean payment 
period in 
monthsa 
Sales 
stipulating 
multiple 
payment dates 
Sales 
payable 
on 
request 
Per cent 
payable 
on 
request 
       
1390-99 37 19 4 1 17 46 
1400-09 55 29 5 - 26 47 
1410-19 36 27 3 - 9 25 
1420-29 45 30 3 1 14 31 
1430-39 25 2 9 - 23 92 
1440-49 104 16 4 - 88 85 
1450-59 79 4 26 - 75 95 
1460-69 55 7 4 - 48 87 
1470-79 23 1 2 - 22 96 
1480-89 5 - - - 5 100 
1490-1500 33 1 2 - 33 100 
 
All data 
1490–1500 
 
 
 
497 
 
 
136 
 
 
4 
 
 
2 
 
 
360 
 
 
72 
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the case with loans, from the 1430s onwards sales were, in over 80 per cent of instances, 
described as payable upon request.  When payment deadlines were specified, payment 
schedules were very occasionally set out. Two such cases appear in the LATL dataset, 
both arising from transactions made before 1430, and both allowing just two instalments 
leading to full payment within a year.44 
The third and most commonly cited form of credit relationship detailed in cases at 
Common Pleas was a debt recorded in a ‘bond’, a formal written instrument bearing the 
debtor’s seal and usually described as a ‘scriptum’, within which the debtor ‘granted 
himself to be bound and obliged by his certain writing obligatory’ (per quoddam 
scriptum suum obligatorium concessisset se teneri et obligari).45 The mode value of 
bonds cited in London creditors’ fifteenth-century lawsuits was £20, or ten times the 
mode value of loans and sales of goods (Table 5). The mean value of all bonds in the 
LATL dataset is similarly about £20, or four times that of loans and twice that of sales of 
goods, but decadal means could be as high as £29 in 1400–9 and £39 in the 1390s.  
 
                                                 
44 TNA, CP40/659, rot.121; TNA CP40/669, rot.126. 
45 Often, from the later fifteenth century, scriptum was replaced by ‘billa’, all else remaining the same. 
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Table 5. London creditors’ bonds, terms of payment and prosecution of cases brought on multiple bonds 
Years All 
bonds 
with 
payment 
data 
Bonds 
stipulating one 
payment date 
Mean 
payment 
period in 
monthsa 
Bonds stipulating 
multiple payment 
datesb 
Payable on 
request 
Payable to 
the bearer 
Cases brought on multiple 
bonds made the same day 
within decade. 
  no. per cent 
of all 
bonds 
 no. per cent 
of all 
bonds 
no. per cent 
of all 
bonds 
no.c no. per cent of 
all cases 
on bonds 
            
1390-99 57 48  84 5 9 16% - - - 1 of 56 2 
1400-09 112 101 90 5 9 8% 2 2% - 9 of 93 10 
1410-19 174 160 92 8 10 6% 4 2% - 22 of 130 17 
1420-29 203 190 94 7 12 6% 1 0.5%  - 23 of 172 13 
1430-39 115 115 100 20 - - - - - 15 of 74 20 
1440-49 351 338 96 9 12 3% 1 0.3% - 38 of 302 13 
1450-59 280 276 99 7 4 1% - - - 19 of 248 8 
1460-69 319 307  96 7 11 4% 1 0.3% - 21 of 289 7 
1470-79 114 112 98 8 2 2% - - 2 8 of 98 8 
1480-89 13 13 100 30 - - - - 4 2 of 9 22 
1490-1500 88 77 88 7 7 9% 4 5% 1 6 of 74 8 
 
All data 
1390–1500 
 
 
 
1,813 
 
 
1,737 
 
 
8 
 
 
76 
 
 
4% 
 
 
13 
 
 
1% 
 
- 
 
164 of 1545 
 
11 
 Notes: a Stipulated payment periods of 1–30 days have been calculated as one month. 
  b That is, multiple payment dates on the face of the bond, irrespective of any endorsed conditions of defeasance. 
  c No per cent is given because these all stipulate either a single or multiple payment dates.  
Source: Mackman and Stevens, eds, ‘Court of Common Pleas’. 
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What makes the significance of bond values difficult to assess is the bond’s diverse 
uses beyond the mercantile sphere, arising from the simplicity and versatility of the 
instrument.46 The text of a ‘simple bond’ described the obliged party’s obligation to the 
obligee, or creditor.  The obliged debtor’s seal was applied to the document to make it 
sufficient for the creditor-plaintiff to plead ‘specialty’ in a lawsuit for recovery of the debt.  
The practical importance of specialty to the litigants was the prohibition of the debtor in such 
lawsuits from offering a general denial and compurgation –that is, a lawsuit-terminating oath 
denying the debt assisted by eleven compurgators– as defendants were wont to do in response 
to accusations of a debt arising from a loan or sale of goods.47 Bonds allowed creditors a 
greater degree of security, by disallowing compurgation and thereby limiting the debtor to a 
narrow range of defences at common law, principally to the claims that the bond had already 
been paid, that the bond was a forgery, that the debtor had been underage or under duress at 
the time of the bond’s making, or, most importantly, that it had been made null and void by 
the fulfilment of some associated condition.  
A simple bond contained no ‘nullifying condition’ (that is, a statement of something 
which, when done, would void the debt or obligation) on the document itself, only 
instructions for feasance (that is, instructions to pay or to do something) written on the face of 
the bond, but such a condition was sometimes recorded on an indenture made on the same or 
a subsequent day stipulating a series of payments or actions required for defeasance (that is, 
required to make void the debt or obligation).48 Also, the face value of a simple bond might 
                                                 
46 Postan, ‘Private financial instruments’.   
47 McGovern, ‘Contract in medieval England’. 
48 For example, Shore V. Asshby, TNA, CP40/873, rot.124. 
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be greater than payment value of the nullifying condition on the indenture.49  In effect, this 
transformed the simple bond into a penalty device designed to deter nonfeasance.  More 
common even than simple bonds were bonds endorsed with their nullifying terms of 
defeasance, referred to interchangeably as ‘conditional bonds’ or ‘penal bonds’.  In the 
fifteenth century, before the rise of actions of assumpsit, or actions seeking compensation 
from defendants who failed to complete an agreed undertaking, the use of conditional bonds 
was fundamental to securing the completion of contracts, either commercial or non-
commercial.50  The diverse conditions with which penal bonds were endorsed are known to 
us because defendants being sued for payment of penal bonds often asked that the bond be 
audited (that is, read aloud) before the court. While a defaulting debtor was liable to pay the 
face value of his bond, irrespective of any partial fulfilment of the condition, the sum sought 
by plaintiffs varied between the unpaid portion of the conditional sum and the bond’s full 
penal face value.51 An avaricious plaintiff might even sue a writ of debt against a defendant 
for the face value of a penal bond plus the unpaid conditional sum required by the associated 
agreement, as London citizen and brewer John Spenser pled in two lawsuits brought against 
the executors of Sir Simon Felbryg of Norfolk, in 1445, for unpaid bonds and unpaid rents on 
London properties.52 Lastly, penal bonds might have nullifying conditions which were 
commercial, as when reflecting credit for cash or goods; semi-commercial, as when requiring 
the obliged party to demise certain lands or rents; or even non-commercial, as when requiring 
respectful behaviour or participation in arbitration between parties.53  
                                                 
49 For example, Rasyn V. Clapoull, TNA, CP40/645, rot.109. 
50 Teeven, ‘Proving fifteenth century promises’; Baker, An Introduction, pp. 329–41.      
51 For example, Staverton V. Parmenter, TNA, CP40/953, rot.304; Fayreford V. Hert, TNA, CP40/823, 
rot.219d. 
52 TNA, CP40/736, rot.465. 
53 TNA. CP40/828, rot.127; CP40/874, rot.143 (failure hold to a farm); CP40/874, rot.632 (unpaid rents); TNA, 
CP40/657, rot.310 (avoiding another’s wife); Stevens, ‘Failed arbitrations’. 
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It is this diversity of bonds which has led to strong criticisms of their use as a gauge of 
the health of fifteenth-century economy.54 However, when the endorsements of conditional 
bonds on which London plaintiffs brought lawsuits were audited, we can see that they were 
overwhelmingly commercial or semi-commercial in nature, with nullifying conditions most 
often requiring the payment of monies.  Also, bonds were individually negotiated, and their 
face value, where greater than the sum required by the nullifying condition, had to be realistic 
and proportional for both parties to agree to it.  Where known, the face, or ‘penalty’, value of 
London plaintiffs’ bonds normally bore a direct relationship to the sum required by the 
endorsed nullifying condition, for example the face value being equal to or double the sum 
specified in the condition, perhaps reflecting the presumed credit worthiness of the debtor.55  
Bonds almost universally stipulated a due date for payment of their face value (that is, 
separate from conditions endorsed or on associated indentures) throughout the fifteenth 
century (Table 5).  The mean period between the making of a bond in the LATL dataset and 
its due date was typically around seven to eight months, and in some decades perhaps a year 
or more, with generally less than 10 per cent stipulating multiple repayment dates on their 
face.  This was substantially longer than the five months or less creditors allowed debtors for 
the repayment of loans or payment for goods sold on credit, before those transaction types 
shifted to the use of ‘payable on request’ contracts in the 1430s.  Moreover, the interval 
between the making of a bond and the due date of its face value probably underestimates the 
total payment period available to debtors adhering faithfully to agreed conditions of 
defeasance.  Where the endorsed defeasance of penal bonds is known, the due date of the face 
value often corresponds with the due date of the first of a series of instalments stipulated in 
                                                 
54 See above, note 20. 
55 For example, TNA, CP40/562, rot.458 and rot.535d. (equal); CP40/562, rot.311 and rot.319 (double). 
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the nullifying condition.56 This allowed the creditor to begin seeking payment of the face 
value of the bond at the first instance of the debtor defaulting on any defeasance payment.  
In summary, London creditors were discerning about how they used the credit devices 
available to them.  If a would-be debtor needed a small amount of money to purchase diverse 
items, a creditor might well lend coins, to a sum of about £5.  A London wholesaler or 
tradesman might offer a gentlemen or redistributor (for example, a peddler or chapman) a line 
of credit for medium sized transactions to a sum of about £10. When the volume of credit 
requested was relatively large –that is, about £10 or more– or the would-be debtor’s 
creditworthiness questionable, a bond would be drawn up.   
 Generally speaking, small to medium loans and sales of goods would have comprised 
the bulk of Londoners’ transactions, if not necessarily the majority of the total value of credit 
they extended.  Hence, the impression given by LATL data, that transactions secured by a 
bond were most frequent (Table 2), inverts the reality of everyday business in the city, where 
smaller transactions would have predominated.  As Nightingale discovered from the 1390s 
account book of the London ironmonger Gilbert Maghfeld, he never employed bonds in any 
more than 36 per cent of his credit arrangements in even his most rocky financial years, and 
did so much less often in better times.57 As the records of Common Pleas indicate, creditors 
were disproportionately likely to go to law to recover debts which were relatively large and 
which they had gone to the trouble and expense of recording in a written instrument 
specifically so that they might enjoy the advantages of pleading specialty should recovery at 
law become necessary.  In contrast, the more day-to-day, lower-value, and shorter-term loans 
and sales of goods on credit may serve as a better barometer of changes to the credit market 
                                                 
56 For example, Staverton V. Parmenter, TNA, CP40/953, rot.304; Fayreford V. Hert, TNA, CP40/823, 
rot.219d. 
57 Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, pp. 62–4. 
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than either bonds or the high-value certificates of Statute Merchant and Staple assessed by 
Nightingale.58 
 
III 
An examination of Londoners’ fifteenth-century credit transactions, assessed through 
the setting out of a series of decadal data points, illuminates the relationships between the 
mean values of loans, sales of goods on credit, and bonds, jointly and severally, and the 
changing trajectory of the broader economy.  This data must be assessed with an awareness 
of the innate bias of the LATL dataset. It is based on a calendar of lawsuits plead in four main 
sample periods, 1399–1409, 1420–9, 1445–50, and 1460–8, plus the outlying years 1480 and 
1500, and so likely inflates mean vale and payment periods for transactions furthest in 
advance of the sample years (especially the 1430s and 1480s). Nevertheless, it allows a 
comparison with Nightingale’s decadal data of the mean value, and sum value, of debts in 
default recognized under the Statutes Merchant and Staple and deposited with chancery.59  
 
 
Figure 1. Decadal totals of credit, Statutes Merchant and Staple 
Source: Nightingale, 'Gold, credit and mortality', p., 1084, Figure 2 
 
                                                 
58 Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’. 
59 Ibid., p. 1087. 
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Figure 2, Decadal average value of debts in default, Statutes Merchant and Staple 
 
Source: Nightingale, 'Gold, credit and mortality', p. 1087, Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Sum of the average value of London creditors’ loans, sales of goods, and bonds 
Source: Table 2; Mackman and Stevens, eds, ‘Court of Common Pleas’. 
 
 
This is a PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT only.  
See the published version for reference. Economic History Review 2016. 
 24 
 
Figure 4. English mint output in kilograms of silver minted 
Notes: a In these years most production was from the Calais mint. 
 b Re-coinage and devaluation. 
Source: Spufford, Money and its use, Appendix III
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Nightingale is the chief proponent of the monetarist interpretation of the fifteenth-
century depression, in which a lack of silver coinage is posited to have led to a 
destructive withdrawal of credit.  This is best illustrated by her analysis of debts in 
default recognized under the Statutes Merchant and Staple.  She has hypothesized a 
positive relationship between decadal fluctuations in the average value of individual debts 
(Figure 2) and changes in mint output, which reflect the level of the total money supply, 
when interpreted with sensitivity to episodes of elevated mortality among creditors and to 
changes in the level of agricultural wages, which reflect consumer welfare.60 Additionally 
she has assessed the total value of all Statute debts in default on a decadal basis (Figure 
1).  It is impossible to detail the whole of Nightingale’s narrative here, but it is sufficient 
to summarize her main points, with reference to Figures 1 and 2, so that informed 
comparisons may be made with the LATL data in Figure 3. Figure 4 indicates mint 
output.  
Nightingale suggests that mint output in the final decade of the fourteenth century had 
already slumped below a level sufficient to meet England’s needs.61 The years 1400–9 
then witnessed a further 70 per cent decline in mint output combined with heightened 
mortality of about five to eight per cent among creditors, leading to less money in 
circulation and fewer wealthy merchants to lend and borrow it, depressing average debt 
values.  The 1410s saw a debasement and re-coinage of silver pennies together with 
further heightened mortality, having the potential to increase per capita coin supply; and, 
average Statute debt values did increase in this period.62 But, Nightingale cites a 40 per 
                                                 
60 See Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’, p. 1083, ‘Figure 1, Decadal mortality of the creditors’ and 
related text.; Clark, ‘The long march’. 
61 Ibid., p. 1092.  
62 Ibid., p. 1093. 
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cent decline in decadal total credit in default, and the relatively small amount of silver re-
coined, as evidence of an economy-damaging withdrawal of credit driven by a ‘failing 
circulation of silver’.63  In the 1420s the average value of debts in default continued to 
rise, but Nightingale again emphasizes a further decline in the total value of credit in 
default in her source as evidence of a further withdrawal of credit exacerbated by 
exceptional mortality in 1423–4, which ‘provoked a crisis of confidence’.64  As a result of 
a sharp increase in silver minting in the late 1420s and early 1430s, the average value of 
Statute debts peaked in 1430–9.  Nightingale points out that Blatcher estimated that this 
was similarly a medium-term high point for the value of suits before the courts of King’s 
Bench and Common Pleas, an estimation borne out by comparison with the LATL data in 
Figure 3.  Nightingale attributes smaller average debt values in the 1440s to a sharp 
reduction in London mint output from 1436 and the closure of the Calais mint in 1440, 
making the period 1441–5 the nadir of mint output in the fifteenth century.65 A temporary 
increase in mint output in the 1450s contributed to a short-term increase in average debt 
values, but in 1464–5 the crown resorted to a re-coinage and 20 per cent devaluation of 
silver specie.66 Nightingale emphasizes that from 1470–95 the total number of certificates 
of Statute debts in default, and their annual total value, continued to fall, attributing this 
to continued, inadequate minting of silver coinage.  She does not comment on the rise in 
the average value of individual Statute debts during this period.67  Finally, she argues that 
                                                 
63 Ibid., p. 1093. 
64 Ibid., pp. 1093, 1096. 
65 Ibid., p. 1098; Blatcher, The Court of King’s Bench, p. 168. 
66 Ibid., p. 1098–9. 
67 Ibid., p. 1099. 
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under Henry VII, in the 1490s and particularly from 1497, silver bullion supply was 
improved, mint output improved and economic recovery was stimulated.68       
Nightingale’s work also conveys a secondary narrative regarding the increasing share 
of Statute debt in default featuring a London creditor.  Londoners increased their share of 
Statute debts from about 22 per cent at the opening of the fourteenth century, to about 31 
per cent in the 1330s, 50 per cent in the 1390s –even though ‘prominent London 
merchants suffered bankruptcy, and their failure dragged down others with them’–  52 
per cent in the 1420s, 70 per cent in the 1450s, and 83 per cent in the decade 1500–9 .69 
This narrative reinforces the earlier work of Derek Keene, who surveyed debt cases 
before the Court of Common Pleas in 1424 and 1570, and found that the proportion of 
cases laid in London, that is arising from agreements alleged to have been made in 
London, rose from about 26 per cent in 1424 to about 65 per cent in 1570.70    
Overall, the LATL data (Figure 3), follows same general trends identified by 
Nightingale in her assessment of debts in default recognized under the Statutes Merchant 
and Staple (Figures 1 and 2).71 Figure 3 displays the sum of the decadal average values of 
loans, sales of goods on credit, and bonds agreed by London creditors.  The decadal 
growth or decline of average transaction values in Figures 2 and 3 is remarkably similar, 
especially for the 1390s and 1400s, and again for the 1420s to 1470s.   
With these trends in mind, the LATL data in Figure 3 is, if anything, in greater 
harmony with Nightingale’s narrative of economic decline relative to mint output than 
the average decadal values of Statute debt displayed Figure 2.  In particular, the sum of 
                                                 
68 Ibid., pp. 1099–2000.  
69 Ibid., pp. 1087, 1092, 1098, 1100; Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, pp. 56–9. 
70 Keene, ‘Changes in London’s economic hinterland’, pp. 64, 66–7.  
71 Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’, p. 1087. 
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London creditors’ average loan, sale of goods on credit, and bond values from the LATL 
dataset fell across the decades 1400–19, which witnessed the debasement of silver 
coinage, weak mint output, and high mortality.  Likewise, the sum of Londoners’ average 
transaction values declined in the 1480s, in line with continued low mint output.  In each 
of these periods the average value of Statute debts increased, when we might instead have 
expected the value of Statute debts to have fallen in response to a low mint output, and 
Nightingale has chosen to emphasize alternatively a decline in the decadal total credit 
value of all Statute debts in default.  Thus, as the agreement between Figures 2 and 3 
shows, there is a clear correlation between mint output and transaction values, 
undoubtedly enhanced by the reality that from that the 1420s onwards the majority of 
creditors in Statute debts were Londoners. 
 
IV 
 
While the harmony of the LATL data with Nightingale’s own narrative and data 
reaffirms our understanding of the contours the depression, that alone does not validate 
the monetarists’ core assertion that these changes occurred because creditors actively 
withdrew credit in a context of falling mint output.  Testing this proposition requires the 
specification of the mechanics of that ‘withdrawal’ in modern economic terms, based on 
the narrative of events that monetarists have articulated.  This can be done using the 
LATL data.   
Nightingale acknowledges that most decades in which she sees a reduction in silver 
specie supply as leading to a withdrawal of credit, there were also high levels of 
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mortality.  But she singles out the year 1400 as the first point at which the total value of 
credit in Statute debts in default declined faster than population, that is, a 40 per cent 
decline in total credit in default; and likewise, the average value of individual Statute 
debts fell from about £70 in the 1390s to less than £57 in 1400–9.72 Further, she identifies 
the failure of the average value of debts to return to previous levels in the following 
years, as they did in the years immediately following ‘the two great epidemics of 1349 
and 1362’, as indicating that ‘monetary factors had by 1400 become more significant than 
mortality in causing the contraction of credit’.73 In brief, the decade 1400–9 is held up as 
evidence of the two pillars of the monetarist interpretation of the fifteenth-century 
depression.  First, the ‘monetary factors’ referred to are the weak mint output and reduced 
money supply, leading to economic contraction because the necessary velocity with 
which the remaining specie would need to have circulated to service all transactions was 
untenably high.74  This is best illustrated by the fall in the total credit value of Statute 
debts in default. Second, the fall in the average value of individual debts together with the 
long duration of the subsequent economic contraction, as viewed through Statute debts, is 
illustrative of the failure of credit to compensate, elastically, for either the silver specie 
shortage or the increased velocity of specie circulation required to offset it.75    
Moving beyond Nightingale’s own argument, this scenario suggests that from about 
1400 lenders began to engage in what economists refer to as ‘credit rationing’ in which 
there were potential debtors seeking credit and willing to pay the necessary transaction 
                                                 
72 Nightingale, ‘Gold, credit and mortality’, pp. 1093–4. 
73 Ibid., p. 1093.   
74 See above, the discussion of the Irvine Fisher Identity.  Se also, Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, p. 55. 
75 Monetarists argue that credit enhances velocity, which has limited elasticity, without supplementing 
money supply [Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, p. 55].  Demographists argue that credit did contribute to 
money supply.  Unless credit provision expanded at known crisis points, such as 1400–9, this is a mute 
point.  
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costs to attain it, but who nevertheless were not always able to attain credit.  Creditors, 
fearful of adverse selection in which only the least creditworthy borrowers would assent 
to higher transaction costs, and now unable to determine the default risk of potential 
debtors due to their inconsistent capacity to attain sufficient silver specie to repay their 
debts, began to safeguard their own liquidity by granting credit to only a portion of 
potential debtors.  That is to say, creditors were responding to what economists call the 
‘transaction motive’ in which creditors retain money in hand so as to complete their own 
essential transactions, and the ‘asset motive’ in which creditors retain money as an 
appreciating asset under deflationary conditions.76  Further, the chronic shortage of specie 
throughout the fifteenth century created a long-term defect in the credit market sufficient 
to give rise to equilibrium credit rationing in its pure form (see below), which steadily 
underfunded the economy and drove down gross domestic product until that market 
defect was rectified by increased silver specie supply.  As Nightingale has reported of the 
actions of failed London ironmonger, Gilbert Maghfeld, ‘despite growing 
demand…Maghfeld’s consciousness that his cash flow was diminishing made him reduce 
the scale of his transactions’, namely by ‘cutting the amount of credit he gave for 
commercial transactions’.77  
Importantly, in pure equilibrium credit rationing, because creditors cannot gauge the 
credit worthiness of potential debtors, they reduce the total volume of credit which they 
extend by simply offering credit to fewer debtors.78  They do not necessarily reduce the 
size of individual credit transactions. This would explain the otherwise contradictory 
                                                 
76 Tobin, ‘Liquidity preference’. 
77 Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, p. 59. 
78 Stiglitz and Weiss, ‘Credit rationing’, pp. 408–9. 
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trends of average Statute debt values rising in the 1400s, 1410s, and 1480s, while the 
total value of Statute debts in default in each decade declined sharply (Figures 1 and 2). 
At its most basic, pure equilibrium credit rationing is a reduction in supply.  In 
contrast, demographically focused historians such as Postan, and his more recent 
successors such as Hatcher and Bailey, simply attributed economic contraction to a 
reduction of demand, precipitated largely by a fall in population.79 We are able to test 
these competing views of falling credit supply versus falling credit demand using the 
detailed LATL transaction data.  As credit markets move toward equilibrium, where 
credit supply is less than demand, creditors are at liberty to increase transaction costs, that 
is, to offer credit on terms more favourable to themselves (see below); conversely, where 
supply is greater than demand creditors are forced to lower transaction costs.  If creditors 
began to ration credit from the early fifteenth century, thereby artificially creating a long-
term and economy-crippling shortage of credit, then the terms of LATL credit 
transactions should become self-evidently more favourable to creditors over time.80  If a 
declining population led to falling demand, debtors should have received credit on terms 
increasingly favourable to themselves as creditors competed for market share. 
The terms by which London creditors in the LATL dataset offered credit clearly did 
become more favourable to creditors in the early fifteenth century, as the depression 
deepened.  Interest data, the primary measure of market adjustment in modern credit 
markets, is not available for Londoners’ medieval transactions, as interest was usually 
                                                 
79 Hatcher and Bailey, Modeling the Middle Ages, pp. 190–2. 
80 Limited by enhanced adverse selection. Stiglitz and Weiss, ‘Credit rationing’, pp. 393–4.  
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calculated as part of the agreed debt value because it was technically illegal on religious 
grounds.81 However, changes to the terms of repayment are extremely instructive.   
London creditors in the LATL dataset almost universally negotiated more favourable 
terms of repayment across the century.  Loans and sales of goods on credit both saw a 
dramatic increase in the proportion of transactions designated payable on request in the 
first half of the century, as lenders began to make credit less readily available (Tables 3 
and 4).  Some 13 to 19 per cent of loans were designated ‘payable on request’ in 1390–
1409, falling to 7 per cent in 1410-9, with lenders perhaps taking heart in Henry IV’s 
effective end of the civil war and Welsh rebellion which had followed his usurpation, as 
well as the re-coinage cited by Nightingale (Table 3).82  But, as the depths of the 
depression hit in the 1420s, combined with the severe mortality of 1423–4, the proportion 
of loans deemed payable on request rose to 25 per cent in 1420–9, then to 82 per cent in 
1430–9, and ultimately to between 90 and 100 per cent of all loan transactions in 1450–
1500.83  Changes to the repayment terms of sales of goods follow a similar pattern, with 
46–7 per cent of sales of goods being payable on request in 1390–1409, falling to 25 per 
cent in 1410–9, but then rising to 31 per cent in 1430–9 and further to 85–100 per cent 
thereafter.   
Designating loans or sales of goods as payable on request offered the creditor two 
main advantages. First it empowered the creditor to demand immediate repayment of a 
debt should the creditor find him or her own self in need of cash.  Second, should the 
debtor become insolvent, it allowed the creditor to sue for reclamation of the debt, at 
                                                 
81 Nightingale, ‘Money and credit’, p.52; and, as cited there, Postan, ‘Private financial instruments’, p.31; 
Jones, God and the Moneylenders, pp.114–5; Seabourn, Royal Regulation, pp.25–70. 
82 Nightingale, Gold, credit and mortality’, p.1093. 
83 Ibid., p.1096. 
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Common Pleas or elsewhere, immediately upon a debtor’s failure to meet a demand for 
repayment.  The latter could prove an indispensable advantage when a debtor came 
publically into financial difficulty, as when a debtor was imprisoned as a result of another 
creditor’s litigation.  For example, in Trinity term 1402 London brewer John Clerk plead 
that German ‘merchant’ Everard Stepyng owed him 100s. on a bond.84 Stepyng, delivered 
to the court from the city of London’s Newgate prison, acknowledged that he owed Clerk 
the debt, and so was committed to the Fleet debtors’ prison, whereupon the sheriffs of 
London reported that Stepyng had been incarcerated in Newgate prison because he had 
already been found liable in thirteen other debt suits. Similarly, in Jenks’ partial 
reconstruction of the 1461–2 lost London Sheriffs’ Court proceedings, using primarily 
documents querying why persons had been incarcerated by the court, 95 debtors (or 
groups of debtors) were defendants concerning 182 debts, and just ten (11 per cent) of 
these debtors were defendants concerning 68 (37 per cent) debts.85 Clearly, a debtor 
becoming insolvent could induce something akin to a run on the bank, and speed of 
litigation could be of the essence for creditors hoping for repayment against a debtor’s 
dwindling assets.    
It is self-evident that debtors who borrowed money or purchased goods on credit, 
even when the debt was designated payable on request, would have agreed with the 
creditor on an expected timeframe for payment, before which they would not have 
anticipated the creditor calling in the debt under normal circumstances.  This was 
probably similar to the repayment period which continued to be stipulated for some loans 
and sales of goods.  But the normalisation of such debts as payable on request, from the 
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1430s, must have made it exceedingly difficult for the debtors of London creditors to 
trade effectively, as they were themselves often creditors to less affluent persons. For 
example, we can imagine a trickledown effect in which the above discussed pedlar of 
Bury St Edmunds or the German merchant would themselves have extended credit on 
only a payable on request basis, to ensure their own liquidity.86 
Further detailed evidence of credit rationing and liquidity protection by lenders is 
visible in the dynamic relationship between the average values of loans, sales of goods on 
credit, and bonds (Figure 3).  As described above, when viewed across the century, sales 
of goods were typically twice the value of loans, and bonds were twice the value of sales 
of goods.  The driving force behind changes in the sum of the mean values of these 
transaction types in each decade of the century was change in average bond value.  But, 
against the backdrop of shifting bond values, the relationship between the more every day 
transactions of loans and sales of goods fluctuated markedly, as creditors rationed credit 
for sales of goods even more strictly than cash loans (Figure 3). 
In periods of economic contraction, as indicated by falling average bond values, the 
mean value of loans increased relative to the mean value of sales of goods.  For example, 
across the decades 1400–1429 the mean value of sales of goods was only 1.6 times that of 
loans, and in 1400–9 and the mean value of sales of goods was just 1.3 times that of loans 
(Table 2).  In periods of what might best be called partial recovery, for example in the 
1430s, the value of sales of goods was 6.3 times that of loans and in 1500 it was nine 
times that of loans.  Even if the limited data for these years, furthest in advance of LATL 
sample periods, somewhat exaggerates these trends, they nevertheless suggest that 
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creditors under stress preferred lending cash to selling goods.  Presumably, they felt 
making cash loans could more quickly increase their own liquidity.  This conclusion is 
reinforced by Nightingale’s assessment of Maghfeld’s accounts, in which she discovered 
that the London ironmonger reacted to the faltering economy of the 1390s by reducing 
the total value of his transactions by half, and by attempting to replace his falling profits 
by money lending.87  Between 1390 and 1395 he increased the share of credit he offered 
in cash money, as opposed to sales of goods, from only about a quarter of credit he 
extended to 95 per cent of credit he extended.88 Maghfeld, faced with bankruptcy, may 
represent an extreme example of restructuring, but the LATL data of London creditors 
reaffirms that further rationing credit for sales of goods and engaging in more potentially 
liquidity-generating money lending was a typical response to crisis. 
Terms of repayment for bonds in the LATL dataset also became more favourable to 
creditors in the first half of the fifteenth century.  The main indicator of this is a decrease 
in the proportion of single bonds with multiple payments stipulated on their face, and an 
increase in the proportion of all debt cases brought on multiple bonds made the same day. 
A bond with full details of payment written on the face of the instrument, especially 
where indicating multiple instalments, was almost inevitably a simple bond, with no 
agreed penalty for nonfeasance.  In contrast, the preponderance of bonds made during the 
century were penal bonds, with a single due date on the face and endorsed conditions of 
defeasance, often including multiple defeasant payments totalling a substantially lower 
sum (see above, Section II).  The proportion of all bonds in the LATL dataset described 
in litigation as having multiple payments on their face declined from 16 per cent in 1390–
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1 to 6 per cent in 1410–29, and then remained just 4 per cent or less until recovering to 9 
per cent in 1490–1500 (Table 5).   
More problematic still for debtors was the corresponding increase in creditors’ use of 
multiple penal bonds relating to the same debt, made on the same day; that is, the 
recording of each of multiple instalments towards the payment of a sum agreed on a 
single day as a separate debt with a separate penal bond.  If several of these fell into 
arrears, they might be the subject of a single lawsuit for the total of their face, or penalty, 
values.  For example, in 1480 Eleanor, the former wife and executrix of the late London 
tailor John Martyn, and her new husband, Henry John, alleged that Prior Thomas Banys 
of Folkston Priory owed them £25 6s. 8d. as the unpaid residue of five separate bonds, all 
made on 13 March 1465, one having been due each Michaelmas thereafter.89 Overall, the 
proportion of London creditors’ actions of debt on a bond or bonds, in which the 
plaintiff(s) sought repayment of multiple bonds made on the same day, rose dramatically 
during the first decades of the depression, from just two per cent in the 1390s to as high 
as 17 per cent in 1410s and 20 per cent in the 1430s, as renewed lending during the 
partial recovery of the latter decade was subject to creditors’ new stricter lending regime 
(Table 5).  The proportion then settled to 7–13 per cent in the following decades (save in 
the small sample of the 1480s) as a new trend followed, in which creditors brought 
multiple lawsuits against the same debtor.  
From at least the middle of the century, particularly astute creditors increasingly 
brought a separate lawsuit for each of several bonds made on the same day.  This raised 
litigation costs but also increasing the chance of a judgement against a defendant should 
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he or she make a procedural error or fail to appear in person, or by attorney, to process 
each lawsuit in each law term after the initial pleading, for example, by failing to appear 
before a jury at assize.  This was the tactic adopted by London citizen and draper John 
Drope, who in 1465 brought two consecutively recorded cases, on two separate bonds, 
against Coventry dyer John Pope.90  Each bond was made on 26 August 1462 for a face 
value of £25 10s., one being due at the feast of St Bartholomew 1463 and the other at the 
same feast in 1464.  Drope was successful in both actions and awarded debt recovery, 
damages, and costs in each.   
The use of multiple penal bonds with sequential due dates comprising instalments 
towards a single sum of agreed credit, as opposed to a single penal bond with a face value 
payable at the first instalment date, was significant enough to lead to an increase in the 
decadal mean payment period of bonds across the century, from about five months in the 
decades 1390–1409 to about eight months thereafter (Table 5), keeping in mind the less 
reliable LATL data of the 1430s and 1480s.  Further, the making of separate bonds for an 
increasing number of instalments towards a single sum of agreed credit may slightly 
reduce the decadal data of mean bond values from perhaps the 1470s onwards.  In these 
decades, the proportion of single cases brought on multiple bonds fell, and the use of 
multiple related cases, like those of Drope V. Pope, increased.   
As a test of whether credit was withdrawn in the fifteenth century or demand simply 
slumped with demographic decline, the increasingly lender-empowering terms by which 
Londoners extended credit strongly suggest that credit was rationed to such an extent that 
demand exceeded supply.  New modes of doing business emerged during a dynamic 
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period of economic contraction, throughout the 1390s and 1420s.  From the 1430s most 
loans and sales of goods were agreed under the condition of payment on request, while 
creditors regularly succeeded in recording larger sums of credit in multiple penal bonds, 
corresponding to separate payments towards an agreed sum. It is unlikely that these 
stricter terms of borrowing would have been accepted by a shrinking pool of borrowers 
with an abundance of creditors to choose from, as the position of demographically 
minded historians suggests. The duration over which these practices remained in effect, 
abating if at all only from the 1490s, thus indicates that London creditors engaged in pure 
equilibrium credit rationing in response to a long-term structural defect in the market, as 
pointed to by the work of monetarist historians.   
 
V 
This article highlights the records of the Court of Common Pleas as a new and detailed 
source of data, reflecting the broad contours of the fifteenth-century depression through 
the loans, sales of goods, and bonds by which Londoners extended credit.  More 
importantly, the data presented here demonstrates both that London creditors actively 
withdrew credit during the century, potentially damaging the wider economy, and that 
they may have done so in response to a liquidity crisis.  Londoners’ credit rationing, 
across the range of principal transaction types available to them, is illustrated by the rise 
of supply-side dictated unforgiving lending practices such as insistence on payable on 
request credit, would have radiated outwards from London, like ‘ripples…into the 
countryside’.91  Credit-hungry lesser merchants, as redistributors buying from Londoners, 
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would have been forced to mimic these terms when themselves extending credit in order 
to hedge against the possibility that their own debts might be called in.  Together, the use 
of payable on request credit, and London creditors’ tendency to offer smaller sales of 
goods on credit and larger loans (relative to one another) for quick cash profit in periods 
of economic stress, suggests an enhanced transaction motive and asset motive consistent 
with a liquidity crisis.  Confirming these conclusions regarding creditors’ anxiety to 
increase their own liquidity is the first appearance of a handful of bonds in the last 
decades of fifteenth century which describe the debt as payable to the bearer of the bond 
or bill (Table 5), a provision common to informal bills under law merchant, but having no 
power under common law, which supported remedy for only the original creditor.92 
Overall, even as Londoners rationed credit and sought to increase their own liquidity, a 
shortage of silver specie would have been only the most significant of factors influencing 
their behaviour within a broader context Postan’s demographic decline amid recurrent 
pestilence and war –meaning a shrinking customer base.  But the evidence presented here 
demonstrates that London creditors’ actions were consistent with the monetarist assertion 
that credit was restricted England’s financial capital, potentially crippling the realm’s 
economy. 
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